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COMMENTARY
NO-FAULT: AN INVITATION TO MORE ACCIDENTS
LAWRENCE LAWTON, P.E.*
I. INTRODUCTION
As we are all aware, proposals have been made to compensate
persons injured in highway accidents regardless of fault. While it
is claimed that the drastic changes in regard to the fixation of
responsibility will not increase the number of accidents, this view
is not supported by responsible research. Aruging that it is unrealis-
tic to determine fault in vehicular mishaps, some social and legal
theoreticians, in arriving at their conclusions, have made unverified
assumptions regarding traffic safety. For example, Daniel Patrick
Moynihan has theorized that accidents simply happen at random.
Because chance supposedly plays a dominant role in auto mishaps,
it is to be inferred that it would make no difference were the current
fault system abolished.' He also suggested that a large proportion
of accidents are caused by vehicular malfunction and, therefore, are
not due to the culpability of drivers. 2 Taking a different approach,
but arriving at the same conclusion, Professors Robert E. Keeton
and Jeffrey O'Connell have argued that no change in law can sig-
nificantly affect driver behavior because the overriding factor in
auto management is the driver's fear of injuring himself.3 Further,
they contend that because criminal law would still exist, this deter-
rence would be sufficient.'
In 1969, the Defense Research Institute asked me to determine
the deterrent effects of the current fault system. Having examined
the assertions made by the proponents of no-fault, in conducting
my study I used the analytical techniques developed in a twenty-
ive year span of traffic-accident research and modification of
* B.S.C.E., College of the City of New York; Advanced Studies in Traffic Engineering
undertaken at Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute and Yale University; Member, Institute of
Traffic Engineers, American Society of Civil Engineers, Municipal Engineers Society of
New York, and International Municipal Signal Association; Associate, Highway Research
Board.
1. D. MOYNIHAN, REPORT OF SECRETARY'S ADVISORY CONMITrEE ON TRAFFIC SAFETY
at 101 (1968).
2. Id. at 82.
3. R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICIM 253 (1965).
4. Id. at 368.
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driver and pedestrian environment. It was my conclusion that
adoption of a no-fault system would materially increase accidents,
injuries, and fatalities. 5
Two subsequent studies were also made in regard to accident
occurrence and deterrence. In 1970, a Department of Transporta-
tion study, prepared by Professor David Klein and Dr. Julian A.
Waller, recommended that resources be diverted to modification of
environmental conditions and away from determination of individ-
ual culpability in roadway accidents.6 In 1971, my original findings
were supported in an independent work prepared for the Defense
Research Institute by Dr. James C. Mancuso, who warned against
radical changes of well-practiced policies and recommended an in-
creased usage of procedures, such as the tort system, wherein indi-
viduals face each other to determine culpability. 7
Destruction of our present system, which is primarily concerned
with accident causation, should not be countenanced until there has
been a reasonable showing that such a change will not increase the
current toll of highway injuries and deaths. It is my sincere hope
that the following summary of my own research and my comments
on the Klein and Waller study will result in a better understanding
of the issues involved.
II. THE LAWTON STUDY
In commencing my investigation, I first examined the basic
assumptions underlying the no-fault concept to determine whether
they were in accord with accepted safety research.
First receiving my attention was the assumption that random
chance is the primary cause of accidents. If this were true, accidents
would vary in direct proportion to the traffic voiume. Investigation
has shown, however, that the risk of an accident is much greater
at night, particularly after midnight-a time at which traffic
congestion is minimal. Since the condition of cars and highways
remains constant after midnight, the increased accident rate is ob-
viously due to a greater prevalence of faulty driving. Further, if bad
luck were the principal causative factor, accidents would occur
5. L. LAWTON, FAULT: A DETERRENT TO HIGHWAY ACCIDENTS (1969); L. LAWTON,
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE FAULT SYSTEM AS COMPARED WITH THE NO-FAULT SYS-
TEM OF AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (1969).
6. D. KLEIN & J. WALLER, CAUSATION, CULPABILITY AND DETERRENCE IN HIGHWAY
CRASHES (1970) [hereinafter cited as D.O.T. MONOGRAPH].




uniformly throughout the driving population. However, surveys of
broad population groups show that there is a much higher degree
of accident involvement in certain groups. Young male drivers, in
particular, have a vehicular death rate that greatly exceeds any
other group. In addition, many studies demonstrate that accident-
involved drivers tend to be psychologically maladjusted, using their
cars as mechanisms for venting tensions. The importance of driver
psychopathology in accident causation has also been indicated by
the higher accident rate among poor credit risks and people hospi-
talized for suicidal gestures. Alcoholics and other problem drinkers
are involved in 25,000 traffic fatalities each year. Considering the
combined accident experience of the psychological misfit and the
excessive drinker, it is apparent that a small proportion of our
population is responsible for more than half of all serious accidents.
These findings refute the contention that accidents are primarily the
result of random chance.
Another assumption of no-fault proponents is that many acci-
dents are the result of vehicular defects and, thus, cannot be attrib-
uted to the culpability of drivers. While it is true that vehicular
malfunction accounts for a small, but significant, portion of acci-
dents, this, too, is a form of negligence for which there is no excuse.
Not only must we attempt to eliminate the manufacture and opera-
tion of defective automobiles, we must also correct deficiencies in
highway design. Most hazards caused by these deficiencies could
be eliminated by following published safety policies and
procedures.
Proponents of no-fault who assume fear of self-injury to be the
major deterrent to mishaps ignore the fact that many people do,
in fact, knowingly engage in inherently dangerous activities despite
the risk of harm involved. Holding the belief that tragedy will never
strike home, people readily banish their fears. This type of rational-
ization has enabled millions of people to freely smoke cigarettes
despite the obvious danger of lung cancer. As applied to the auto-
mobile, widespread non-use of seat belts demonstrates the fact that
most drivers simply do not believe they will ever be involved in a
serious accident. In light of this, it should not be so readily assumed
that fear of self-injury is a sufficient deterrent to vehicle
mismanagement.
Those who would abolish our present system of tort recovery
also assume that the imposition of criminal sanctions supplies an
1972]
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adequate deterrent. This, again, ignores the fact that few of us
believe we will be involved in a major accident. In addition, most
of us realize that serious criminal penalties result from only a small
proportion of all major accidents. Police can enforce traffic laws
only when evidence of violations will meet the standards required
by criminal law. While charges of speeding can be supported by
mechanical means, such as radar, the majority of driver actions
causing accidents cannot be documented through means which will
meet the strict standards of criminal law. Consequently, invocation
of criminal law and quasi-criminal punishments, such as fines, have
not deterred highway accidents. In light of these factors, the deter-
rent value of a possible, future criminal prosecution can be said to
be, at best, remote.
Traffic engineers have long been acquainted with the truism
that every citizen is his own traffic expert. Because the problem of
roadway mishaps is far too important to be decided on the basis
of unsupported assumption, claims of such "experts" to the effect
that no change in law could increase accidents cannot be control-
ling. What must be applied to evaluate the changes in safety which
could be expected from a change in automobile insurance law are
the disciplined techniques of systems analysis. The formulation of
a systems model makes it possible to determine the relationship
between accident frequency and system deterrence. Before any
change is made, particularly where public safety may be involved,
it is essential that policymakers have in their possession the best
possible knowledge of the attributes of the system to be changed.
Based in part upon experiments which have demonstrated the
effect of group pressure upon individual behavior and results ob-
tained through employment of the systems analysis method, I have
concluded that the present system of tort recovery based on per-
sonal liability should be retained. It has often been demonstrated
that individual behavior is influenced by the actual or implied ex-
pectation of others and that actions of individuals often reflect
group beliefs. Many studies have indicated that as the number of
contacts between the individual and the group increase, influence
exerted on the individual simultaneously increases. It has been fur-
ther demonstrated that the intensity of this influence further in-
creases to the extent that the individual is singled out by the group.
This research shows how individuals can be induced to change their
beliefs and behavior when they are exposed to group opinion.
Perhaps a closer look at the nature of experiments conducted
[Vol. 55
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will better demonstrate the effectiveness of group pressure. In one
study conducted at the Lackland Air Force Base, every driver in-
volved in a personal injury accident was called in for a review of
his service record and an interview with the camp psychiatrist. This
method of intensifying the disapproval of faulty driving behavior
reduced the number of personal injury accidents by more than fifty
percent. In another study, conducted by Kaestner in Oregon, prob-
lem drivers were randomly assigned to four groups. No further
contact was made with the first group. A standard form letter was
sent to the second. The other groups were sent letters personalized
to varied degrees. Subsequent accident reduction was found to be
in direct proportion to the extent to which the individual driver was
singled out. Those receiving the highly individualized soft-sell let-
ters were involved in but one-fifth as many avoidable accidents as
those in the first group. In yet another study, this time using sub-
jects involved in only mild traffic infractions, drivers were assigned
to either a personalized interview or a control group. A total of 66
accidents were subsequently recorded in the control group, as com-
pared to only fifty accidents among the drivers interviewed. Simi-
larly, in a study involving three groups-one receiving a simple
warning, the second attending a standard safety school, and the
third participating in sessions run by the author, who allowed wide-
ranging discussion by the participants and interjected only when he
heard a rationalization-it was found that of twenty-three subse-
quently reported accidents, only one involved a member of the third
group.
These demonstrations conducted by independent investigators
all lead to the same conclusion-when negligent drivers are singled
out, the more determined the effort to bring about a realization in
the individual of his wrongful behavior, the greater the reduction
in auto accidents. Because the fault concept is an established norm
and most people believe that driver fault is the primary cause of
automobile mishaps, it would appear, on the basis of experiments
conducted, that the intensification of this belief would reduce acci-
dents. Because tort procedure serves as a community expression of
disapproval of those actions causing accidents, it should not be too
hastily swept aside.
In conducting my study, *I also examined the workings of the
existing fault system to determine the mechanisms by which antipa-
thy toward negligent driving may have permeated the mores of the
community. Analyzed were both the various interactions brought
1972]
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into play as a result of a minor accident and the operating mecha-
nisms of the proposed no-fault plan. Utilizing the parameters de-
rived from the results of the many different investigations con-
ducted, I first constructed a mathematical model and then em-
ployed it to make a detailed step-by-step comparison of the existing
and proposed systems. From this model it was found that the fault
system does, in fact, maximize deterrence, and that the deterrent
value of the no-fault system is virtually non-existent.
A further analysis was made of aggressive driving behavior,
reference being made to definitive studies of aggression. These stud-
ies merely proved what our common sense tells us-that aggression
will seek out the lowest level of retaliation and continue to stalk
those victims against whom a display of aggression will meet with
a minimum of reproof. Inasmuch as the proposed no-fault system
would nullify the existing community disapproval of actions caus-
ing accidents, aggressive drivers would run unchecked through a
series of minor accidents. To experienced accident-analysis engi-
neers, it is well known that only a small margin separates the minor
incident from the fatal accident. If a change in the behavior pattern
of the driver does not follow his involvement in the minor mishap,
a major accident will inevitably result. Should abhorrence of reck-
less actions not be expressed by the community, the aggressive
driver could very readily become involved in an accident resulting
in death or permanent injury.
In light of the fact that the present fault system maximizes
social censure of negligent driving habits, a factor of primary im-
portance in the control of individual behavior, it was, and is, my
opinion that the no-fault insurance system should not be adopted,
as it could only increase the frequency of major automobile acci-
dents.
III. THE KLEIN AND WALLER STUDY
As one of a series of volumes in the Automobile Insurance
Study, the work of Klein and Waller was undertaken for the pur-
pose of determining the relative value of no-fault. Although there
is much of value in this study, it concentreates heavily on elaborat-
ing a negative view of accident deterrence. Virtually no guidance is
offered which would be helpful in determining whether the pro-
posed change in legal systems would increase injuries and deaths.
While I am somewhat flattered that these writers expend much
effort on a critical analysis of my own research, as Dr. Mancuso
[Vol. 55
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has commented, it is unfortunate that so much of their monograph
attempts to discredit Lawton rather than clarify the theory and
principles upon which their own conclusions are based.,
In analyzing the work of Klein and Waller, we see that their
evaluation of the fault system is limited to one brief paragraph,9
consisting of two simple parts. The first assertion (statement "A")
notes that drivers who are members of deviant sub-groups will
conform to deviant, rather than to conventional, driving norms.
The second assertion (statement "B") then concludes that since the
assumed deterrence will least affect the groups most in need of it,
the fault system lacks deterrent value. At first reading, this deduc-
tion may appear to be totally reasonable. "B" follows "A." But
is it really logical?
Klein and Waller tell us that if the precipitation of crashes is
regarded as anti-social behavior, then findings in criminology may
be relevant. 10 Let us turn to a short discussion of criminal behavior
to see if "B" truly follows "A." Following their logic, it could be
said that crime is the result of deviant criminal acts. Since criminal
law does not affect members of deviant sub-groups (criminals), it
obviously lacks deterrent value. Therefore, using their type of logic,
it could be concluded that all laws concerning criminal behavior
should be abandoned. This, of course, is sheer nonsense. If we
abolish the criminal law, who would doubt that crime would
increase?
Taking issue with a conclusion I reached in my study, Klein
would also have us believe that drug abuse, by itself, is not an
accident-causation factor. Thus, he asks, "Can Lawton cite evi-
dence that drug abuse is related to crashes when it is not accompa-
nied by a level of blood alcohol sufficient in itself to account for
the crash?"'" In asking such a question, Klein displays a lack of
knowledge as to accident-causation factors. It is well known that
some drugs, as well as alcohol, interfere with higher brain functions
controlling the exercise of judgment and caution. This lowering of
normal restraint can result in the affected individual's becoming an
incautious driver, thereby increasing his probability of causing an
accident.' 2 Klein, in short, is mistaken as to the facts uncovered by
8. J. MANCUSO, FAULT-A BASIC REQUISITE OF SOUND PUBLIC POLICY 404 (1971).
9. D.O.T. MONOGRAPH at 134.
10. Id. at 204.
11. D. KLEIN, A CRITIQUE OF LAWTON'S "PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS 'OF THE FAULT
SYSTEMi" 40 (1970).
12. L. LAWTON, PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE FAULT SYSTEM AS COMPARED WITH
THE NO-FAULT SYSTEM OF AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 21 (1969).
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research. In a study of actual crash experience, amphetamine abu-
sers showed high crash rates, whereas persons dependent on barbi-
turates and tranquilizers did not.13 In addition, New York State has
conducted research which shows that drug addicts are dangerous
drivers. The records of 1,226 male heroin addicts disclosed a total
of 402 accidents involving injury or death. Yet, not one of these
addicts was ever convicted of driving under the influence of drugs.' 4
The experience in New York State is in accord with my previous
observation that there are no simple tests available to law enforce-
ment agencies which can certify prior consumption of marijuana,
barbiturates, amphetamines, or LSD.15 In marked contrast, use of
the Breath-a-Lyzer enabled 3,000 arrests per month for drunken
driving in North Carolina.1 6 This inability to detect drug usage
would have dangerous implications were a no-fault system adopted.
Accidents would be ascribed to the idle whim of pure chance, and
the existing restraint now exercised by the multitude of users of
milder depressant drugs, such as barbiturates and tranquilizers,
would be lifted.
Using to a large degree a methodology similar to that pre-
viously employed by myself, Klein and Waller, in their inadvertent
depreciation of the underlying safety assumptions of the no-fault
concept, make an important contribution to the cause of those who
would retain the present system. First they offer additional testi-
mony as to the inadequacy of criminal deterrence. Readily admit-
ting that criminal law is not a sufficient deterrent, these writers
point out that the public is aware of the fact that the traffic regula-
tions which are enforced do not cover the types of driver actions
that cause crashes. 7 Furthermore, these writers recognize that if
deterrent measures concentrated on a punitive approach, the only
route open would be to increase the severity of punishment-an
action which would cause intolerable economic and social disloca-
tions. 8 Because the law-abiding citizen feels that he may commit a
similar traffic offense, the public will not support an increase in the
13. D.O.T. MONOGRAPH at 80.
14. N.Y. STATE DEPT. OF MOTOR VEHICLES, DRIVING RECORDS OF HEROIN ADDICTS
(1969).
15. L. LAWTON, supra note 12, at 44.
16. Altman, North Carolina Reduces Auto Deaths for Second Year, N.Y. Times, Nov.
29, 1970, at 86.
17. D.O.T. MONOGRAPH at 139.
18. Id. at 215.
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severity of traffic court penalties. 19 In addition, the futility of crimi-
nal sanctions against the so-called "problem" driver is recognized.
Do not these findings rebut the contentions of Keeton and
O'Connell-the most forceful supporters of the io-fault system?
Further, attacking the foundation of Moynihan's theory, Klein,
negating the validity of the belief that accidents merely happen at
random, has written:
Current research demonstrates clearly that accidents are not ran-
dom events-both the causes and the individuals most likely to
be involved can to some extent be identified. 21
Weakening the arguments of those no-fault proponents who
contend that vehicle malfunction is the cause of a large proportion
of accidents, Klein has noted that neither safety experts nor the
public concur in this belief. While commenting that mechanical
defects are quite likely to contribute to the precipitation of crashes,
he does qualify this remark by admitting that this is not to say that
crashes are caused by vehicular malfunction.2 1
As to the assumption of no-fault advocates that self-injury is
the primary deterrent to those actions causing mishaps, Klein only
indirectly undermines its foundation. While not disputing the evid-
ence I cited for the proposition that people ignore the danger inher-
ent in a potentially dangerous practice in accordance with the ac-
cepted psychological doctrine of cognitive dissonance, 2 Klein's re-
joinder is a statement to the effect that despite this doctrine, ciga-
rette smoking is diminishing.23 But let us look at the record. In
1964, the Surgeon General's report concluded that cigarette smok-
ing causes lung cancer. Since that time there has been a massive
campaign to warn consumers of the dangers of smoking. Neverthe-
less, consumption of cigarettes only decreased from 214 packs in
1963 to 198 in 1970-a drop of less than seven percent. 24 Again we
see additional proof that fear of self-injury simply is not a major
deterrent to those actions likely to result in physical harm.
In addition to their perhaps inadvertent attack upon the very
assumptions relied upon as justification for the position taken by
those supporting no-fault, Klein and Waller also appear to bolster
19. Id. at 133.
20. D. KLEIN, supra note 11, at 18.
21. Id. at 19.
22. L. LAWTON, supra note 12, at 15-20.
23. D. KLEIN, supra note 11, at 36.24. N.Y. Timnes, June 13, 1971, § E, at 2.
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the arguments I make in opposition to change of our present tort
recovery system. For example, does not their basic premise that
drivers who are members of deviant sub-groups will conform to
deviant norms imply that behavior is influenced by social attitude
and, thus, support my conclusion that individual driving behavior
is affected by social attitude? It is interesting to note that Klein, in
1970, co-authored a paper2 . which, in exploring the correlation
between errant behavior of fathers and sons, recognized the rela-
tionship between behavior and socialization processes.2 1 Also in-
structive is Klein's recognition of the court system as an agency of
socialization in discouraging deviant behavior.2 This awareness of
the weight of socialization influences upon driver behavior is evid-
enced in the Klein and Waller study by their citation of past evid-
ence linking social attitude and accident involvement, 21 their discus-
sion of the Kaestner and Syring interview program, 2 and their
review of the Oregon experiment conducted by Kaestner3 0
Not only do Klein and Waller, thus, recognize the role of social
influence upon driver behavior, they also are aware of the effect of
a change in the law upon the attitudes of the individual. In their
words, research clearly demonstrates that "when the environment
25. Carlson & Klein, Familial vs. Institutional Socialization of the Young Traffic
Offender, 2 J. OF SAFETY RESEARCH 13 (1970).
26. In demonstrating this relationship, Klein wrote:
The driving records, academic performance, and police contacts of 8094 male under-
graduates at a large state university were analyzed, and each student's history of
traffic convictions and crashes was compared with that of his father. The positive
correlation found between fathers' and sons' conviction incidence supports the hy-
pothesis that driving behavior is learned more through familiar than through institu-
tional socialization and that delinquent familial socialization results in delinquent
traffic behavior.
Id. at 13.
27. As Klein stated:
The schools, the police, and the court system are social institutions which teach and
enforce the value system generally approved by the society as a whole. . . .(T)hese
institutions encourage behavior believed to produce general social harmony and dis-
courage disfunctional- deviant behavior.
Id. at 15.
28. D.O.T. MONOGRAPH at 17.
29. In discussing this program, Klein and Waller point out that interviews consisting of
mere sloganering and moralizing were ineffective, whereas those restructured to individual
needs and attitudes did reduce accidents. Id. at 164.
30. Agreeing with my observations that the impersonalized from letter used in this
experiment produced no result whereas personalized letters significantly reduced accidents,
Klein and Waller attributed the greater reduction of crash occurrence in young drivers to
the fact "that young drivers would be more susceptible to social influences than middle-aged
and older drivers." Id. at 165.
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is changed, by legislation or by administrative fiat, attitudes change
to correspond to the new environment." 31 We need not wonder
whether attitudes toward safe driving behavior would change under
a no-fault concept. Klein and Waller give us a clear insight as to
what can be expected if individual responsibility is abolished by
law.
In light of their inadvertent attack upon the basic assumptions
of no-fault proponents and their recognition of the major role
played by socialization processes in the control of individual
behavior, one might ask what has caused Klein and Waller to go
astray in their recommendations concerning the adoption of no-
fault. Perhaps it is attributable to their lack of professional experi-
ence in dealing with actual traffic accidents. For example, they
begin their essay with a statement to the effect that there is no
profession dealing with the entire field of traffic safety.32 Thus,
from the start, they are wrong. They should be informed that pro-
fessional concern with traffic-accident causation began nearly forty
years ago with the founding of the Institute of Traffic Engineers.
They are equally misguided in their recommendation that resources
now devoted to the determination of individual culpability be
shifted to a modification of environmental conditions,3 for this
assertion is based on the erroneous premise that the present legal
system is holding back needed traffic-safety improvements.
What may also have caused these writers to go astray is their
proclivity for concentrating on side issues, while by-passing the
obvious. For example, in analyzing the Lackland Air Force Base
study, Klein and Waller note that there was a significant reduction
in crashes through imposition of the threat of psychiatric referral.
While conceding the methodological excellence of this study, Klein
and Waller proceed to criticize it because the airmen were a captive
group and the use of psychiatric referral as a punitive threat might
have stigmatized psychiatric services.3 What they fail to point out,
however, is that the prospect of increased social censure reduced
subsequent accidents by more than fifty percent-the very lesson
to be learned by all the various demonstrations in which accidents
were reduced by emphasizing individual accountability.
Because Klein and Waller avoided the basic issue as to whether
31. Id. at 203.
32. Id. at 5.
33. Id. at 217-18.
34. Id. at 128-29.
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or not the proposed change in legal systems would increase injuries
or deaths, their work should not be cited as justification for adop-
tion of no-fault. As we have seen, the major thrust of their work
consisted of the propagation of a negative view toward accident
deterrence. Having inadvertently attacked the assumptions of no-
fault proponents and bolstered the arguments made by myself,
these writers, nevertheless, claim to have made out a case in support
of abandonment of our present system. Being based, as it is, upon
an improper evaluation of the fault system and the mistaken prem-
ise that our present legal system is holding back needed traffic-
safety improvements, the Klein and Waller study should not be
accepted as scientific proof that adoption of no-fault would cure
our problems regarding highway safety.
IV. CONCLUSION
In light of my former findings, those independently reached by
Dr. Mancuso, and even the inadvertent teachings of the Klein and
Waller report, I do not believe the concept of culpability in driving
behavior should be abandoned. The adoption of a no-fault system
would do far more than remove the existent deterrents to negligent
driving-it would set up an environment in which unsafe driving
habits would no longer meet with social censure. Indeed, under such
a system unsafe actions could even meet with sympathitic under-
standing. Knowing the influence of social censure upon undesirable
behavior, can we afford to abolish a system wherein that censure
is most pronouncedly expressed? Can we afford to gamble with our
lives? Recognizing the folly of hastily effecting drastic change,
Thomas Burke long ago commented:
An ignorant man, who is not fool enough to meddle with his
clock, is, however, sufficiently confident to think he can safely
take to pieces and put together, at his pleasure, a moral machine
of another guise, importance and complexity, composed of far
other wheels and springs and balances and counteracting and
cooperating powers. Men little think how immorally they act in
rashly meddling with what they do not understand.
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